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Book Reviews
Creative Acts of Translation: James Boyd
White's Intellectual Integration
James Boyd White, Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and
Legal Criticism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. Pp. 313.
Elizabeth Mertz*
Responding to James Boyd White's writing is in some ways an intimi-
dating venture. In Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal
Criticism, White calls us to rise above the often deadening and dreary
language in which we are taught to write professionally-and, at the
same time, to transcend the segmented and limited thinking that accom-
panies the fencing-off of intellectual endeavor into separate "disciplines"
in our universities. It is hard to imagine equaling the clarity or eloquence
* I would like to thank the Honorable Richard Cudahy for giving me the opportunity of
learning from a dedicated and talented practitioner of the art James White describes in this book.
While White may be correct that "the law is now in peril of losing its essential character" because of
expedient readings (and refusals to read at all), it is comforting to know that there remain some for
whom "the sense of obligation to give meaning to the texts that make up our world" still yields a
vision of "a community of difference and respect." J.B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN
ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRmCIsM 223-24 (1990). I have seen no more profound
challenge to the overly simplistic legal realist vision that White critiques than the painstaking care
taken with the language of precedent (and of new opinions) in Judge Cudahy's chambers.
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of White's challenge. The apparently effortless grace of his prose conveys
complex thoughts with deceptive simplicity.
And yet White's invitation is hard to turn down, for it opens the possi-
bility of a truly interdisciplinary discussion that
will reflect more fully what we actually know to be true of ourselves
and our minds, of our languages and our cultures[.] Can we find or
create voices that are more fully our own, speaking to audiences
more fully recognized as the minds and people they actually are?
Or, to put it in the terms with which I began: What might it mean to
integrate, to put together in a complex whole, aspects of our culture,
or of the world, that seem to us disparate or unconnected...?V
White poses his idea of integration against other images for interdiscipli-
nary work: the "findings" conception, in which findings or results from
one field are simply transmitted untranslated to another field; and the
"technology" conception, in which the machinery of one field's method-
ology is to be hooked up to the raw material of another field. White's
vision of interdisciplinary exploration is quite different: "what I mean by
integration is a kind of composition, and that in a literal, and literary
sense: a putting together of two things to make out of them a third, a new
whole, with a meaning of its own. '"2
My own reading of Justice as Translation is shaped in part by an inter-
disciplinary background that combines law and anthropology (and, in
particular, anthropological linguistics). I found many congruences
between White's vision and anthropological approaches to language, and
would like to suggest ways of bringing these two understandings
together. At the same time, there are also differences in the ways of
thinking about language that have emerged in anthropology, and I want
to explore what would happen if this differing perspective were brought
to bear on the questions White asks. Although it is a language that is
newer to me, I will also attempt to bring to bear a plural voice, a poly-
phony of voices, from the legal feminist and critical race theory
approaches. These voices sound some of the same themes as White does
and their silence in his text was both puzzling and disappointing.
I accordingly take seriously White's invitation to put together two (or
more?) things to make out of them something new. At every turn, I'm
afraid, I will be falling into the somewhat clunky and less than elegant
language of the social science I am attempting to translate. Nonetheless,
I will attempt to bring together what seem to me to be shared ideas about
language from several traditions, focusing on commonalities and diver-
1. J.B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM 12
(1990).
2. Id. at 4.
[Vol. 4: 165
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gences in an effort to discover what these traditions could learn from one
another.
I. LINGUISTIC CREATIVITY
White follows his initial plea for a new integrative approach with a
critical discussion of the word "concept." In this discussion he moves
very close to some of the most interesting work in anthropological lin-
guistics, work that has for several generations been bringing us an ever
keener appreciation for what I and others have called "linguistic creativ-
ity."3 Let us first consider White's view of the word "concept":
The first pressure of the term is to direct attention away from lan-
guage to something else: to the realm of ideas, to what is in the
mind, or to some field of intellectual reality, and in each instance to
something that is assumed to exist in a realm apart from lan-
guage.... To talk about concepts is thus to take a step in the direc-
tion of talking as if words had no force of their own, as if they were
in fact transparent or discardable once the idea or concept is
apprehended.4
Talking about concepts, White tells us, invites a scientistic discourse that
is definitional and deductive. This approach presents rationality as an
exercise in patterns of definitional equivalence, and rational discourse as
inherently propositional in character. For those who view language as
transparent, the "same" concept is thought to exist in the minds of
speakers everywhere; translation is merely the act of finding the word
that conveys that concept to speakers of different languages. Concepts
exist apart from language, which has no formative effect whatever on
meaning. Talk of concepts, according to White, also tends to represent
language in a dichotomous and linear fashion.5
White then explicates his own quite different view of language:
In ordinary language we use our words in richly overlapping, some-
times contrastive ways, and we know that we define our terms partly
in the way we use them....
[W]ords are not discrete and definable entities .... They do not
3. See Mertz, Sociolinguistic Creativity, in INVESTIGATING OBSOLESCENCE: STUDIES IN
LANGUAGE CONTRACTION AND DEATH 103 (N. Dorian ed. 1989); Mertz, Learning What to Ask, in
REFLEXIVE LANGUAGE: REPORTED SPEECH AND METAPRAGMATICS (J. Lucy ed. 1992)
[hereinafter REFLEXIVE LANGUAGE]; Mertz, Language, Law and Social Meanings, LAW & SOC.
REV. (forthcoming 1992); see also discussions of creative indexicality in Silverstein, Shifter
Linguistic Categories, and Cultural Description, in MEANING IN ANTHROPOLOGY 11 (K. Basso & H.
Selby ed. 1976); Silverstein, Language Structure and Linguistic Ideology, in THE ELEMENTS: A
PARASESSION ON LINGUISTIC UNITS AND LEVELS 193 (P. Clyne, W. Hanks, & C. Hofbauer eds.
1979); and of creative use of reflexive language in Lucy, Reflexive Language and the Human
Disciplines, in REFLEXIVE LANGUAGE, supra.
4. J.B. WHITE, supra note 1, at 28-29.
5. Id. at 32.
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carry their meanings like pieces of freight.... Much of the meaning
of words therefore lies in silence, in the unstated but accepted back-
ground against which they have their meaning .... What is more, in
our actual speech words normally do not exist as discrete units...
but as parts of sentences or other expressions, each of which is
located in a particular linguistic, intellectual, social and cultural
context. It is not the words themselves but their various uses [ ] that
have meaning .... Sentences are better thought of as "practices"
than propositions ....
[O]ur languages, and acts of languaging, are not transparencies
through which thoughts or objects are to be seen, but ways of being
and acting and living in the world. Forms of language are forms of
life. 6
White stresses that language is at once a very personal and individual
matter (because the unique distillation of any person's experience with
language affects and shapes the meanings of that language) and strongly
social (because we learn language from and speak it with others).
This vision of linguistic meaning-as multiple and overlapping, as
emergent from the use of language in context, as culturally forged and
shaped in a practice of speaking that is different in different cultures and
languages (and that is not transparent)-is a vision that lies at the heart
of much of the most exciting current work in anthropological linguistics
as well. This current work draws together many strands of linguistic
thought.
One important strand is the work of Benjamin Lee Whorf, whose path-
breaking approach to language and culture demonstrated that the differ-
ences between languages do affect how speakers approach the world:
Such terms as 'summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset'
are with us as nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from
other nouns. They can be subjects or objects, and we say 'at sunset'
or 'in winter' just as we say 'at the corner' or 'in an orchard.'
In Hopi however all phase terms, like 'summer, morning,' etc. are
not nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE [Standard
Average European language] analogy. They are a formal part of
speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and even other
Hopi "adverbs".... These 'temporals' are not used as subjects or
objects, or at all like nouns....
Our own "time" differs markedly from Hopi "duration." It is
conceived as like a space of strictly limited dimensions, or some-
times as like a motion upon such a space.... Hopi "duration" seems
to be inconceivable in terms of space or motion, being the mode in
6. Id. at 32, 34, 215.
[Vol. 4:165
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which life differs from form. ...
Whorf proceeds to examine the different visions created in different lan-
guage forms as they connect with their cultural and social settings. Com-
pare Whorf, then, with White:
The central danger presented by our talk about concepts is that we
may find ourselves speaking as if there were no reason why people in
different cultures cannot have the same concepts, no reason why dif-
ferent languages cannot express the same concepts. To the part of
our mind that works this way, indeed, variety of language may come
to seem mainly a nuisance, a bother to be eliminated .... I
It is Whorf who takes us into the details of different languages in a sensi-
tive excavation of how they create different universes of understanding
and expression.
Although Whorf was originally subjected to rigidly determinist read-
ings that missed entirely the subtleties of his insight, recent readings have
restored for us Whorf's careful explication of the "habitual" character of
language patterning.' It was never Whorf's goal to link differences in
language with rigid limits on mental functioning-as if a speaker raised
in one language could never learn different ways of talking and under-
standing. Rather, in his view, the regular use of the categories and ways
of talking of a particular language/culture shape speakers' habitual
understandings of the world.' ° These habitual understandings can be
amended or shifted, but Whorf tells us that such an amendment will
always occur through and in language. Again, compare with White: "As
lawyers know-to their cost-it is very difficult to say things habitually,
even things one doubts, without coming to believe them."'"
Curiously, White tells us that among those whom he would accuse of
conceptual thinking are anthropologists who "talk[ ] about the Hopi
'concept' of time" 2-and that sounds like Whorf to me. It is, in fact, the
case that Whorf talks of "concepts." But the entire thrust of his work is
to uncover the way in which patterns in language shape our experience-
to question the notion that our ideas and concepts exist apart from the
language expressing them. Here, I think, we can discern a difficulty with
pinning the substantial problem White is concerned with onto a particu-
lar word, as if use of that one word were the problem. For as White
himself begins by saying, "there is no reason in principle why 'concept'
7. B.L. WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY 142, 143, 158 (1956).
8. J.B. WHITE, supra note 1, at 31.
9. J. Lucy, GRAMMATICAL CATEGORIES AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES (forthcoming); Lucy,
Wharf's View of the Linguistic Mediation of Thought, in SEMIOTIC MEDIATION: SOCIOCULTURAL
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (E. Mertz & R. Parmentier eds. 1985); Lucy, Reflexive
Language, supra note 3; Silverstein, Linguistic Ideology, supra note 3.
10. B.L. WHORF, supra note 7, at 139-40.
11. J.B. WHITE, supra note 1, at 54.
12. Id. at 29.
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could not be used by one writer or another in a way that is adequately,
even beautifully, controlled or qualified." 13  Indeed, it is precisely
Whorf's point (and that of current linguists building from his insights)
that habitual patterning of understanding through language happens
through the use of whole systems of language (grammars) day after day
throughout speakers' lives. Current work in anthropological linguistics
warns us against a focus on individual words, as if they could by them-
selves embody realms of thought-or as if meaning inhered in those seg-
mented chunks of language rather than emerging from the active,
creative use of a whole web of related sounds and meanings. 4 Indeed,
anthropological linguist Michael Silverstein and literary theorist Jacques
Derrida have both pointed (from somewhat different perspectives) to a
focus on words as itself an example of the kind of objectifying tendency
White decries.15
This is a point at which anthropological linguistics has something to
contribute, because it speaks of language not as a combination of words
but as a complex structure that conveys meaning in multiple, intercon-
nected ways. This would not seem to be a vision that contradicts White's
fundamental view. Rather, I think it adds further to his image of an
expression as
a gesture the meaning of which is indissolubly tied to its immediate
and unique context: to its language and culture, to the social rela-
tions out of which it emerges and upon which it acts, to the prior
texts that its author and audience use to establish and understand its
terms, to its location in a particular place in.the physical world, and
so on. 
16
I can only begin a sketch of the view from anthropological linguistics
here, but let me indicate some of the ways in which our emerging under-
standing of linguistic creativity adds depth to White's picture.
The first step in this understanding is an exciting reversal of the usual
ideas about grammatical structure. Much work on grammar has pro-
ceeded as if the main point of language structure is to convey concepts,
propositional information, or meaning that exists apart from any particu-
lar context. By contrast, Silverstein and others are moving us to a funda-
mentally different view of language structure, building from the
understandings of a group of linguists known as the Prague School, from
13. Id. at 26. Although White clearly recognizes the limitations of focusing on individual words
(see text accompanying note 8 supra), I think that here he falls into the trap that he sets himself by
actually using a single word as the focal point of his discussion.
14. See Silverstein, Linguistic Ideology, supra note 3; Silverstein, Metapragmatic Discourse and
Metapragmatic Function, in REFLEXIVE LANGUAGE, supra note 3.
15. See Chandler, The Problem of Purity: Jacques Derrida's Reading of Ferdinand de Saussure
(on file with author) for an exciting exposition of the continuities between these two traditions; it is
from reading his work that I have seen this possible parallel.
16. J.B. WHrrE, supra note 1, at 236.
[Vol. 4: 165
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work on the social context of language by sociolinguists, and from the
work of Roman Jakobson, Edward Sapir, and Whorf (to name but a
few).' 7 In this view, it is the social and expressive function of language-
the contexts of culture and social relations, of prior texts and immedi-
ately surrounding language, of specific speech situations-that organize
its structure.'8 Grammatical structure is at every point responsive to the
fact that it is a system created in use, for speaking, for carrying on social
relationships and constituting cultures.
Here, then, is a very different view of language structure from that
imagined by White when he talks of grammar:
Or think of grammar: Is this the blueprint by which the language is
built, the engineer's design document? Much language-teaching
seems to assume so, but of course nothing could be further from the
truth. Grammar is what we use when we do not have enough expe-
rience of a language to make it our own.' 9
I picture my ninth grade Latin book as I read this passage, and under-
stand the kind of grammar White has in mind. But this is not the kind of
grammar we work with as anthropologists. For us, grammar is the ever-
changing web of relationships between sounds and meanings emergent in
the millions of uses to which speakers put their language every day. It is
the most social aspect of language, in the sense that it is the common
17. It is frustrating to attempt to represent rich and complex traditions by listing names in a
single sentence-and even at that, my list is radically adumbrated, for I have not mentioned Charles
Sanders Peirce or Ferdinand de Saussure, Vygotsky or Bakhtin (and I could go on). And so, at the
very least, I want to beckon the reader interested in a deeper understanding to just a few of the key
texts from these traditions: M.M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION (i. Holquist ed. 1981);
M.M. BAKHTIN, SPEECH GENRES AND OTHER LATE ESSAYS (C. Emerson & M. Holquist eds.
1986); P.J. GARVIN, A PRAGUE SCHOOL READER ON ESTHETICS, LITERARY STRUCTURE, AND
STYLE (1964); C.S. PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, VOL. 2 (C.
Hartshorne & P. Weiss eds. 1974); E. SAPIR, CULTURE, LANGUAGE, AND PERSONALITY (1970); F.
DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (C. Bailey & A. Sechehaye eds. 1983); L.
VYGOTSKY, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF L.S. VYGOTSKY, VOL. I (R. Reiber and A. Carton eds.
1986); J. WERTSCH, VYGOTSKY AND THE SOCIAL FORMATION OF MIND (1985); Jakobson, Closing
Statement: Linguistics and Poetics, in STYLE IN LANGUAGE 350 (T. Sebeok ed. 1960); Jakobson,
Shifiers, Verbal Categories and the Russian Verb, in SELECTED WRITINGS 11 130 (1971).
18. See Silverstein, Shifters supra note 3; Silverstein, Language and the Culture of Gender: At
the Intersection of Structure, Usage, and Ideology, in SEMIOTIC MEDIATION, supra note 9;
Silverstein, Metapragmatic Discourse, supra note 14; see also C. BRIGGS, LEARNING HOW To ASK
(1986); J. GUMPERZ, DISCOURSE STRATEGIES (1982); W. HANKS, REFERENTIAL PRACTICE:
LANGUAGE AND LIVED SPACE AMONG THE MAYA (1990); J. LUCY, GRAMMATICAL CATEGORIES,
supra note 9; R. PARMENTIER, THE SACRED REMAINS (1987); Baumann and Briggs, Poetics and
Performance as Critical Perspectives on Language and Social Life, 19 ANN. REV. ANTHRO. 59
(1990); Brenneis, Grog and Gossip in Bhatgaon: Style and Substance in Fii Indian Conversation, 11
AM. ETHNOLOGIST 487 (1984); Brenneis, Performing Passions: Aesthetics and Politics in an
Occasionally Egalitarian Community, 14 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 236 (1987); Brenneis, Language and
Disputing, 17 ANN. REV. ANTHRO. 221 (1988); Irvine, When Talk Isn't Cheap: Language and
Political Economy, 16 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 248 (1989); Mertz, "Realist" Models of Judicial Decision-
Making: Of Squatters and Pragmatic Contexts, 15 WORKING PAPERS AND PROC. OF THE CENTER
FOR PSYCHOSOC. STUD. 1 (1987); Mertz, The Uses of History: Language, Ideology and Law in the
United States and South Africa, 22 LAW & Soc. REV. 661 (1988); Mertz, Consensus and Dissent in
US. Legal Opinionm Narrative Control and Social Voices, 30 ANTHRO. LING. 369 (1990).
19. J.B. WHITE, supra note 1, at 273 n.12.
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structuring that brings us close enough that we can find some way to
communicate our private meanings in a shared tongue-and that is pre-
cisely why a vision of grammar as constantly shaped and renewed in
crucial ways by its use in social context makes such good sense.
This socially-grounded grammar provides a reservoir from which flow
even routine acts of linguistic creativity in our everyday interactions. It
is through the creative use of this shared structure that we can (in and
with our language) forge relationships, hurt someone's feelings, rupture
the normal order of a meeting, or interpret precedent in a novel way.
Why does this matter? It matters to me because so much of the meaning
we create lies not in those segments we call words2' but in the subtle
structuring of larger stretches of discourse. These larger stretches of dis-
course are responsive to contexts of many varieties-social (e.g., we are
people of unequal social power speaking in a classroom), generic (e.g., I
am using the genre known as storytelling, building on a shared cultural
sense on previous stories we both have heard), intralinguistic (e.g., I am
playing this new image against the images of my immediately preceding
utterance), speech contextual (e.g., I am referring to previous contexts of
speaking, or to the one I am currently creating as I speak), and many
more. And at every point, these contextual dimensions are conveyed and
absorbed in grammar.
In approaching the problem that is for White centered upon the word
"concept," then, we would look not at the word but at a grammatical
structuring of use which permits speakers to talk of ideas much as they
would of things. This structuring focuses attention away from the consti-
tutive and creative character of language and toward aspects of meaning
that are knowable before the event of speaking.21 In listening to the way
people talk, we would certainly find the reifying tendency described by
White in places where the word "concept" never appears, and we could
actually find the word "concept" used to attack this tendency. As we
traced this structure of language in use across sociocultural divisions and
across time, we could begin to understand what kind of social and cul-
tural foundations contribute to the particular shape of this reifying ten-
dency in our society and in our language.22 And to the degree that we
20. And note, interestingly, that linguists have yet to find a satisfactory definition for the word
"word."
21. See Silverstein, Linguistic Ideology, supra note 3; Lucy, Whorf s View of the Linguistics
Mediation of Thought, supra note 9; Mertz and Weissbourd, Legal Ideology and Linguistic Theory:
Variability and its Limits, in SEMIOTIC MEDIATION, supra note 9.
22. I say "particular shape" because some have indicated that this objectifying tendency might
be a universal feature of language (and cultural reflection on language) everywhere. See Silverstein,
Linguistic Ideology, supra note 3; Silverstein, The Limits of Awareness, 84 WORKING PAPERS IN
SOCIOLING I (1981). However, even in the more universalist accounts, this reification takes different
forms in different societies (compare the Javanese and Western examples in Silverstein, Linguistic
Ideology, supra note 3). Thus it would seem to make sense that the shape of cultural reification of
language reflects the social structuring of language in particular societies.
[Vol. 4: 165
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found a part of the sociocultural world to which this reifying tendency
was true, we would also bracket our own critique, understanding that at
some point the ideology might capture some aspect of the social system
of which it is a part. I think that a disciplined inclusion of social founda-
tions as part of our analysis of linguistic creativity is one of the most
important contributions of this anthropological approach.
Although there are important differences here between the approach I
am describing and White's view, there is also a point of continuity, when
White alludes interestingly to the social foundations of the objectification
found in law and economics discourse. In a resounding and courageous
critique of the language and worldview of Posnerian-style law and eco-
nomics,23 White strips away the pretenses of the language to reveal a
barren and troubling vision which
imagines a social universe that is populated by a number of discrete
human actors, each of whom is competent, rational, and motivated
solely by self-interest. . . . [E]conomics cannot, in principle, talk
about any activity, any pleasure or motive or interest, other than the
acquisitive or instrumental one that it universalizes.... This is not
to be "value-free," as its apologists claim, but to make aggressive
self-interest the central, indeed the only, value, for it is the only one
that can be talked about in these terms.... [T]o reduce all value to
self-interest . . . is intellectually and ethically intolerable. How
could one educate one's children or oneself to live in a world that
was neutral on all the great questions of life, except that it reduced
them to acquisition, competition, and calculation?24
This is just a small slice of White's rich account, which looks at the dis-
course as a political system and as an economic system, employing the
author's sensitive ear for language to powerful effect. Of particular inter-
est to me were two further contextualizations of this account.
First, White points to the context of our own culture as a powerful
influence on the thinking of law-and-economics writers who might try to
escape the ordinary meaning of words like "self-interest." He argues that
"in a culture like our own, which is so heavily dominated by the motive
of self-interest in the usual sense, that of selfishness or self-centeredness,"
it is unlikely that speakers could entirely avoid the usual meaning of the
term. He then points out that focusing on economic exchange might
make sense in studying "spheres of life that are in fact characterized by
exchanges that take place on conditions roughly matching the assump-
23. Although White does not make the distinction, I think that somewhat different and more
carefully circumscribed worlds emerge in the work of law and economics scholars who counter the
Posnerian position; see, eg., Donahue, The Impact of Federal Civil Rights Policy on the Economic
Status of Blacks, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 41 (1991); Ayres and Miller, "I'll Sell It To You At
Cost:" Legal Methods to Promote Retail Markup Disclosure, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 1047 (1990).
24. J.B. WHITE, supra note 1, at 51, 57-58, 59.
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tions of the discourse."2 Thus, the assumptions about people and
motives that White critiques so resoundingly might actually be correct if
one is focusing upon "the economic life of the investor or entrepreneur in
a capitalist economy."'2 6 This is the same sort of bracketing that we do in
studying linguistic reification, where analysis of social foundations at
times leads us to accept an objectifying approach as adequate to certain
aspects of social reality.27 Social context, ideological reflection on lan-
guage, and language structure all meet at such points.28
Often the larger structuring of discourse that I have been discussing is
not something that speakers are consciously working with-but therein
lies the power of this kind of meaning. Here is where individual creative
use and socially shared structuring come together, at a level that is
deeply cultural because it is only partly available to conscious aware-
ness. 29 How intriguing it is that so many of the key political and ritual
discourse forms in other cultures structurally mirror, in very subtle and
complex ways, the very model of society or language that they attempt to
reinforce.3 0 Creative acts of language use, playing against past routinized
usages,3 1 enter the shared reservoir and change it.
32
None of this runs against the grain of White's description. Indeed,
although he does not ask about the role of grammar in the patterning he
finds, White discovers in political and legal texts exactly the kind of sub-
tle mirroring that anthropologists have found in grammatical and dis-
course structure. White's discussion of the definition of "deliberation" in
the Federalist Papers is to me startlingly similar to linguistic anthropo-
25. I. at 61.
26. Id.
27. See M. POSTONE, TIME, LABOR, AND SOCIAL DOMINATION: A REINTERPRETATION OF
MARX'S CRITICAL THEORY (forthcoming) for another version of this thought as applied to the
social theoretical analysis of capitalism, where reificatory analyses can be similarly "adequate to" the
objectifying processes they seek to capture. This is always just one moment of the account, however,
and it is crucial that this reificatory approach be recognized as such, and be circumscribed by a
broader awareness of the limits of reification.
28. This is, however, only a very limited example. Of more interest are the points at which
reificatory models are inadequate, and it is here that the anthropological vision of contextual
structuring offers a wonderful opening for uniting understandings from linguistics and literary
criticism, on the one hand, and from social theory and history, on the other. See Silverstein,
Language and the Culture of Gender, supra note 18.
29. See Silverstein, Linguistic Ideology, supra note 3; Silverstein, The Limits of Awareness, supra
note 22.
30. See (Ochs-)Keenan, A Sliding Sense of Obligatoriness, in POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND
ORATORY IN TRADITIONAL SOCIETIES (M. Bloch ed. 1975); Parmentier, The Political Function of
Reported Speech: A Belauan Example, in REFLEXIVE LANGUAGE, supra note 3; Silverstein,
Metaforces of Power in Traditional Oratory, Lecture to Yale Univ. Anthro. Dept. (1981) (on file with
author).
31. This is what Silverstein (Linguistic Ideology, supra note 3; Metapragmatic Discourse, supra
note 14) discusses as the play between presupposing indexicality, where language points to aspects of
the setting we already knew about, and creative indexicality, where language, in pointing to its social
context, creates that very context.
32. Similarly, Victor Turner tells us that Beckett changed the notion of the martyr in deploying
commonly shared symbols to creative new use. See V. TURNER, DRAMAS, FIELDS AND
METAPHORS: SYMBOLIC ACTION IN HUMAN SOCIETY (1974).
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logical discussions of the creative and contextual character of language,
which is always structured by its use (but also, we would add, always
using its structure). Thus, White tells us that the good writer "give[s]
her terms meaning in her use of them," and goes on to demonstrate how
this happens in the Federalist Papers: "How is 'deliberate' defined? Never
by explicit description, never conceptually or stipulatively .... Instead,
the term is given meaning by a kind of performance or enactment in the
text itself.""3 This enactment of a structure of meaning in the structure
of a text is quite similar to what anthropologists have found in key ritual
and political genres in other cultures.34 Because this kind of enactment is
quite subtle, and often is not overtly signalled or consciously reflected
upon, it can contribute in a powerful way to a speaker's sense that the
model being mirrored (of society, of language, of the polity, of interpreta-
tion) is somehow natural or "given." Much of the rest of White's book is
an exploration of this kind of enactment in a series of American legal
cases, as he unpacks his vision of law as a conversational process.
II. CREATIVE ACrS OF TRANSLATION AND THE INTEGRATION OF
VoIcES: NONTRANSPARENT LEGAL LANGUAGE
At the heart of White's book are seven carefully crafted analyses cen-
tering on Fourth Amendment cases and on cases dealing with the treat-
ment of racial minorities. Throughout a number of these chapters White
traces again and again continuities between the vision of the judicial task
held by judges and the way they craft their opinions.
We begin with Frankfurter's opinion in Rochin v. California,35 which
White takes as an illustration of the way in which "[i]n every judicial
opinion the judge gives himself a character of personality, demonstrating
by the performance certain intellectual and ethical qualities which he of
necessity asserts to be appropriate to his role."' 36 In Rochin, Frankfurter
moves outside of the terms of previous cases to apply the exclusionary
rule where there is conduct that "shocks the conscience." White views
Frankfurter as stepping outside of the realm of reasoning discourse to
assert simultaneously "the power of the moral, aesthetic, and civilized
actor over the language and categories of the law,"'37 the role of the
33. J.B. WHITE, supra note 1, at 37.
34. In the technical vocabulary of semiotics, these are "indexical icons"-"indexical" because
they are deeply dependent upon the context they create, and "icons" because they mirror in the
structure of their performance the social or linguistic reality they seek to forge. As should be evident
from the preceding discussion, anthropologists have looked at different levels and kinds of
structuring of discourse than White is dealing with here. But I think that the two inquiries come
very close in their discovery of a quiet mirroring, at subtle levels of the text, of the message it seeks to
convey.
35. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
36. J.B. WHITE, supra note 1, at 111.
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Court as the "conscience" of the nation, and a judge's capacity (to judge
well) as the ground for judicial decisionmaking. The form of the argu-
ment mirrors the model of judicial decisionmaking (and of the authoring
judge) upon which the opinion rests.
White then considers examples of "original intention" approaches
found in the opinions of Justice Story in Prigg v. Pennsylvania 38 and
Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford.39 He again traces the way
the opinions model in their form their claimed basis of authority. Here,
the authors attempt to pierce the language of the text to find the intent
behind it, eliding the multiple possible voices of the text itself and of its
many "authors" (as well as of the people implicated in any particular
case) in an image of "a masterful and coherent human actor who knows
everything about both his own wishes and the possible circumstances in
which these wishes will be significant."'  This masterful actor is at once
the original "intender" and the author-judge, writing in a style that
erases contradictions and alternative voices.
In examining the majority and dissenting opinions in Olmstead v.
United States,41 White again discovers a kind of textual imaging. This
time we see in Chief Justice Taft's authoritarian majority opinion the use
of a "plain meaning" approach to authorize wiretaps under the Fourth
Amendment. This is a rhetorical style that asserts the raw power of the
author's conclusory statements about what language means as a founda-
tion for judgment. By contrast, White sees Justice Brandeis in his dissent
as "a defender of individual rights who speaks as an individual and to us
as individuals":
The heart of Brandeis' opinion lies in a vision of human culture
working over time, in a sense that we have something to learn from
the past as well as something to give to the future.... For Brandeis
the individual and the community alike are engaged in a continual
process of education, of intellectual and moral self-improvement;
the law in general and the Constitution in particular provide a cen-
tral and essential means to this process. 42
I think it is fair to say that this view closely approximates the approach
to (at once) law and translation, language and community, that White
would advocate.43
38. 41 U.S (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
39. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
40. J.B. WHITE, supra note 1, at 134.
41. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
42. J.B. WHITE, supra note 1, at 157.
43. Robin West has dubbed White's approach "moral textualism." West, Communities, Text,%
and Law: Reflections on the Law and Literature Movement, I YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 129, 132 (1988).
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These essays, then, begin an excavation along lines White indicated in
a previous book, When Words Lose Their Meaning," where he focused
on several key points in understanding texts: the contexts provided the
author by language and culture, the remaking of those contexts through
creative use of (nontransparent) language, and the kind of community
that is created with readers of the text. In this volume, White concen-
trates on particular aspects of those concerns in reading the texts that are
Supreme Court opinions: "the character the opinion gives the court...
the kind of relations it establishes with those it talks to (and about), and
... the kind of conversation it establishes for the future."45 His explora-
tion yields both an image of what legal opinions can and should be-a
conversational process in which 'democracy begins' 6- and a discourag-
ing conclusion as to the current state of that conversation.
Although there are many points at which to engage these rich discus-
sions, I can choose only a few. I have begun by continuing the dialogue
of the first section of this essay between White and current anthropologi-
cal linguists, for both are intrigued by the mirroring of worldview in dis-
course form that often characterizes key political and legal texts in many
societies. This mirroring is not automatic or necessary, but it is a power-
ful reinforcement of the image that a text seeks to create or reinvigorate.
It is one way in which nontransparent language works creatively.
White's essays are thus also a further demonstration of his insistence that
language is not transparent. Ideas are forged in the language of the text;
they are not preexisting entities clothed in language.
As we have seen, anthropologists, among many others," share this
view, insisting both that language does not transparently reflect preexist-
ing "concepts," and also that it does not transparently reflect the social
divisions it often seems to mirror and reinforce." This last point is pre-
cisely why the connection between any particular shape of discourse and
a message it seeks to convey must be viewed as contingent rather than
necessary or automatic: while it is possible for certain kinds of language
to achieve certain results (e.g., formal language creating distance), these
results always follow from creative acts of culturally-interpreted lan-
". J.B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY (1984).
45. J.B. WHITE, supra note 1, at 214.
46. The quotation is from Dewey.
47. Again I am constrained by this context from a thorough review-but sociolinguists,
anthropologists and scholars working on language and law from a sociological vantage have all
converged on a view of language as nontransparent (see Mertz, Language, Law and Social Meanings
supra note 3, for a review of the literature).
48. See, e.g., J. CONLEY & W.M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990); C. GEERTz, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER
ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983); L. ROSEN, BARGAINING FOR REALITY: THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL RELATIONS IN A MUSLIM COMMUNITY (1984); L. ROSEN, THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE: LAW AS CULTURE IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY (1989); Mertz, Language,
Law and Social Meaning supra note 3; Silverstein, Metapragmatic Discourse, supra note 14.
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guage use-and the interpretation can always move in another direction,
creatively formulating new connections between discourse form and
social effects (e.g., a parent using formal address as a "pet name" for a
child to convey intimacy). This is why anthropologists may hesitate over
a further movement in White's writing, which takes a nontransparent
approach to language and recommends it as a normatively "better" way
of writing legal opinions, and indeed, of constituting communities in and
through legal translations. This move from language to social effect elic-
its a queasy feeling among anthropologists that is not only a general
ambivalence about normativity, but is also born of a questioning about
the relationship between language and social power.
Thus, White carries the nontransparent vision of legal language to the
very foundation of his argument about judicial opinions. For White,
judicial opinions are occasions for careful reasoning about previously
written legal language such as the Constitution or previous judicial opin-
ions. The reasoned discussion White envisions does not treat previous
legal texts as transparent to authors' intent or policy arguments or static
"plain meaning," but respects the complex creative character of the lan-
guage itself. In fact, as White so aptly remarks, "original intention"
arguments "erase[ ] the one intention we do know about, the intention to
publish this language [of the Constitution] as authoritative."49 He thinks
that attempts to evade the language of legal texts by hiding behind "origi-
nal intention," "plain meaning," or bald assertions of judicial conscience
is an abdication of judicial responsibility to carry forward the complex
ethical process of interpreting legal texts.
This point is developed further in an essay that examines judges'
attempts to use precedent to evade this responsibility--either through
"commonsense" readings of prior cases coupled with straightforward
determinations as to whether these cases have been overruled, or through
a kind of "providential history" of which the judge is an observer:
"'Once we thought this, but we were wrong; gradually we have come to
see the truth.'-"5 The first of these approaches has much in common
with a "plain meaning" reading, while the latter reminds us of the judge
as "conscience." Finally, White takes us through successive narrowings
of the exclusionary rule in opinions that similarly escape serious consid-
eration of prior legal texts through a focus on factual determinations. In
these cases, the facts are weighed in an attempt to determine whether the
cost of excluding evidence to the criminal justice system is balanced by
possible deterrent effects on wayward law enforcement officials."'
Against these evasions he poses an alternative vision:
49. J.B. WHITE, supra note 1, at 135.
50. Id. at 172.
51. Id. at 211-21.
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Our tradition has embodied a sense of law as a way of respecting
that which is external to the present moment and to the present will,
namely, the judgments and experiences of others as these are
recorded or reported in authoritative texts. The law thus creates a
political world characterized by the separation of powers, a world in
which there is no despot but in which each of us must live with
judgments with which we disagree, when made by those authorized
to make them. Of course this authority is not absolute, but depends
upon its perpetual reconstitution by the people of the law.
52
The authority of legal texts, in White's view, "must be created rhetori-
cally, in the opinion itself ... it depends upon the informed understand-
ing of the reader and upon his acquiescence. . . ,, 3 This vision of a
community that is created by insuring opportunities for everyone to be
heard and to be reasoned with is in some ways reminiscent of Michael
Perry's work. Perry stresses the value of a deliberative political process
in which social transformations are accomplished through rational dis-
course, free of coercion.54 In a quite different vein, Jurgen Habermas"
also focuses on the role of participation in practical discourse. Through
this participatory discourse the consent of all concerned could be
obtained as a foundation for normative decisions.56
What, then, would be the source of anthropological hesitation over
this scenario? On the one hand, anthropologists, unlike lawyers, have at
least the theoretical luxury of abstaining from evaluation at certain
points in their work (although, of course, we have found out increasingly
how value-laden even seemingly neutral abstentions can be). Anthropol-
ogists are not as versed in normative arguments as legal theorists, and I
think that there is much that they can learn from colleagues who rou-
tinely have to take positions on deeply divisive political issues as part of
their work.5 7 I have thought this especially as I have become acquainted
with the work of feminist and critical race theorists in the legal academy,
whose work is an exciting blend of social, theoretical, and linguistic
52. Id. at 223.
53. Id. at 217.
54. M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY (1988).
55. Habermas, What is Universal Pragmatics? in COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF
SOCIETY 1 (T. McCarthy trans. 1979).
56. See also T. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE FOLLOW THE LAW: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY,
AND COMPLIANCE (1988) and J. CONLEY AND W.M. O'BARR, supra note 48, for discussions of how
permitting citizens a chance to be heard and reasoned with often facilitates acquiescence in otherwise
unpalatable results. The political implications of this are, to say the least, deeply troubling.
57. It is difficult to specify the difference between the two fields in the sense that anthropology is
no less a value-laden and political activity. However, legal scholars (who are generally also lawyers)
occupy a specialized institutional niche that requires a practice of normative judgment with powerful
social consequences (because of the institutional role of law in this society). See Bourdieu, The Force
of Law. Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 201 (1987). As someone trained
first in anthropology and then in law, it has been my experience that the normative engagement that
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insight invigorated by an unabashed moral sensibility that is lacking in
much social science work.
These theorists share with White an appreciation for the nontranspar-
ent and socially powerful character of language. Listen to Mar Matsuda
talking about the transformative power of language:
Douglass' skill in transforming the standard text of American polit-
ical life into a blueprint for fundamental social change is instructive.
He chose to believe in the Constitution, but at the same time,
refused to accept a racist Constitution. In his hands, the document
grew to become greater than some of its drafters had intended.
Douglass' reconstructed Constitution inspired black readers to
endure the tremendous personal costs of resistance. Martin Luther
King, Jr.'s reconstructed Constitution produced the same effect in
the twentieth century.
This ability to adopt and transform standard texts and main-
stream consciousness is an important contribution of those on the
bottom. Black Americans... have turned the Bible and the Consti-
tution into texts of liberation ....
Those who lack material wealth or political power still have
access to thought and language .... In poetry, the most concen-
trated form of language, black women have employed words to criti-
cize and transform existing assumptions.
58
Here is a respect for the constitutive and creative character of language
that in many ways parallels White's. Their respect for the power of lan-
guage leads these scholars to a suspicion of the nihilism characteristic of
some radical "realist" approaches-a suspicion shared by White. Even
though it may be deeply problematic, the language of legal rights
matters:
It is true that the constitutional foreground of "rights" was shaped
by whites, parcelled out to blacks in pieces, ordained in small favors,
as random insulting gratuities. Perhaps the predominance of that
imbalance obscures the fact that the recursive insistence of those
rights is also defined by black desire for them .... "Rights" feels so
new in the mouths of most black people. It is still so deliciously
empowering to say. It is a sign for and a gift of selfhood that is very
hard to contemplate reconstructing (deconstruction is too awful to
think about!) at this point in history.59
58. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 323, 334-36 (1987); see also Fineman, Dominant Discourse: Professional Language and
Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988). Fineman's work is
a particularly exciting blend of feminist insight with careful attention to the actual language used in
legal settings. Her move to discourse beyond the language of legal opinions brings her close to
anthropological concerns.
59. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructed Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 430-31 (1987).
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Because they appreciate the power of language form, many legal-feminist
and critical race theorists also share with White a suspicion of language-
as-usual, of standard propositionally regimented speech. Compare
White's final two chapters in Justice as Translation, in which he drops
standard writing format, with Derrick Bell's And We Are Not Saved,' a
book which similarly violates common scholarly writing norms, making
its point in the form of the writing.
Here is White: "Do not look for propositions here .... Listen to the
voices: my voices and your own."" And here is Richard Delgado, insist-
ing that we listen to excluded voices, voices that have not been heard in
legal texts:
Members of outgroups should tell stories. Why should members of
ingroups listen to them?
Members of the majority race should listen to stories, of all sorts,
in order to enrich their own reality. Reality is not fixed, not a given.
Rather, we construct it through conversations, through our lives
together. Racial and class-based isolation prevents the hearing of
diverse stories and counterstories. It diminishes the conversation
through which we create reality, construct our communal lives....
Listening to the stories of outgroups can avoid intellectual
apartheid. Shared words can banish sameness, stiffness, and mono-
chromaticity and reduce the felt terror of otherness when hearing
new voices for the first time.62
In this comparison you can perhaps see the source of my disappointment
and surprise at finding no reference to these alternative traditions in
White's work, for it would seem that he of all writers would understand
their plea to be heard, their urgent request for inclusion in the texts of
other legal scholars.
But beyond a general ambivalence about normativity,63 there is a fur-
ther anthropological discomfort with White's move from "is" to
"ought." I am torn because the community of reasoning speakers,
respectful of prior texts and committed to hearing many voices, is in
many ways appealing-and I think that White has captured the aspira-
tional core of the community of judges at their best. And yet I am trou-
bled by the thought that any discourse form can be thought to carry in it,
necessarily, (and without the specificity of social grounding) the key to a
particular kind of community. This uneasiness became strongest as I
read White's discussion of the slave cases, in which he tied a discourse
60. D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987).
61. J.B. WHITE, supra note 1, at 231.
62. Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionalists and Others: A Pleafor Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2411, 2439-40 (1989); see also Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984).
63. And it is more a lack of any clear disciplinary foundation, any really persuasive collective
tradition for thinking about it, than a commitment to value neutrality.
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form ("original intention" arguments) to the shocking abrogation of
responsible argument embodied in Taney's use of overtly racist language
to justify a racist result.64 Would the "same" result have been any better
if the opinion had been phrased more deliberatively, with more thorough
consideration of all of the legal texts, meanings, and voices involved?
For, given the context of the law at the time, even with all of the possible
arguments to the contrary in mind, it seems quite possible to have
reached that sort of result after considered weighing of the legal authori-
ties and texts at hand. White's full community in which all voices are
heard might never follow from repeated, careful readings of this kind, if
the documents and texts on which the readings are based themselves
envision exclusion and subjugation.65
And so it seems to me that, with full respect for the power of lan-
guage-indeed, precisely because of that power-there are times when
the kind of conversational process White envisions is simply not enough
to achieve the community he seeks. This is because that conversational
process is itself socially bounded-and here both the anthropological and
the feminist and critical race theory perspectives can be brought to bear.
White talks of the perpetual reconstitution of authority by the "people of
the law,"' but there are so many people who are members of our wider
society who are not represented or understood or even heard by "people
of the law." Listen to Patricia Williams' voice as she speaks of slavery,
not as a category over which legal actors will discourse and debate, weav-
ing more and less reasoned arguments, but as social and psychological
and physical violence:
The individual and unifying cultural memory of black people is the
helplessness, the uncontrollability of living under slavery.... My
great-great-grandfather Austin Miller, a thirty-five-year-old lawyer,
bought my eleven-year-old great-great-grandmother, Sophie, and
her parents (being "family Negroes," the previous owner sold them
as a matched set). By the time she was twelve, Austin Miller had
made Sophie the mother of a child, my great-grandmother Mary.67
Subsequently Williams does take us into an imaginary courtroom, in
which she attempts to use the language of the law to save her great-great-
grandmother. She makes us aware of the deeply offensive character of all
legal translations in that setting; we see that no available legal argument
could have done justice to the injustice involved.68
Legal feminists similarly stress the almost impossibility of translation
64. J.B. WHrrE, supra note 1, at 126.
65. West makes much the same point in her discussion of White's earlier work. See West, supra
note 43, at 154-56.
66. J.B. WHrrE, supra note 1, at 223.
67. Williams, supra note 59, at 418-19.
68. Id at 421-23.
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into legal categories of some aspects of women's experience.6 9 This
theme of almost impossibility should find a sympathetic ear in White,
whose final chapter contains a delicate exploration of that very issue.
But from this difficulty of translation, this boundedness of the commu-
nity of legal discourse, this often exclusionary character of the past texts
themselves, comes for me a question-is not the value of the conversa-
tional process White describes so beautifully not itself dependent upon
who is being allowed to talk, on what texts we are to treat respectfully
(think, painfully, of respect paid to the legal texts of Nazi Germany or of
modem South Africa), on what languages are possible in this process?
And do we not then have to add to our vision of conversations that might
facilitate community and justice, an understanding of the socially-specific
grounding of those conversations in societies?
The answer from anthropology is a resounding yes.70 We must under-
stand language in its social context. We cannot begin by assuming that
particular discourse forms carry within them beneficial or detrimental
social results. This is to assume a transparency between language and
society, and such an assumption is no more valid than a presumed trans-
parency between language and thought. It is because language is at once
socially creative and socially grounded that we must always examine
carefully the particular sociohistorical settings within which it operates.
Although White at times appears to advocate such an approach, he at
other times strongly hints that given social results flow from the use of
particular discourse forms. For example:
... [Y]ou can gather that I think the proper result in Prigg would be
to uphold the Pennsylvania kidnapping statute, in Dred Scott to find
the plaintiff a citizen of the United States. In addition I think that
the reading of the Constitution in a more lawyerly way would have
led to substantial difficulties, emotional and intellectual, with the
results reached in these cases.... To focus, for example, upon the
circumstances of Mrs. Morgan's freeborn child in a way that recog-
nized that he was a person, entitled to freedom but needing his fam-
ily, would have been to realize that Mrs. Morgan and indeed her
unfree children were people too, a realization, which, if articulated
with sufficient clarity would have tended to erode, not the discourse
of law, which it would have exemplified, but that part of it which
maintained slavery.71
White seems to imply that recognition of the personhood of Mrs. Mor-
gan and her children would follow from a lawyerly reading of the Consti-
69. See M. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF
DIVORCE REFORM (1991); K. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW (1987).
70. This view is shared by many legal feminists and critical race theorists as well.
71. J.B. WHITE, supra note 1, at 139-40.
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tution. But that recognition would have to build not only upon a reading
of legal texts, but also upon a particular socially situated construction of
those texts and of social identity that would permit application of legal
categories to people previously excluded from the legal and social cate-
gory "person." This re-construction would be a powerful interpretive act
responsive to the general balance of social power at the time, emergent
cultural understandings, the general position of the courts in maintaining
or disrupting the reigning social understanding, and the openness of a
particular judge to new social constructions.
The particular interpretation or result reached by a judge, then, would
not follow automatically from taking a certain approach to legal lan-
guage, but would depend in important ways on the use of that language
in a complex sociohistorical context. The language form alone does not
provide sufficient grounding for the legal result. There appears, at least
linguistically, to be a necessarily ungrounded moment in the leap from
"is" to "ought." The grounding for the "ought," if there is one, must
come from a rich unpacking of the social context of language use in par-
ticular societies at specific historical moments. We can then say with
some measure of precision how a particular discourse form is participat-
ing in this or that social formation. Whether or not the social formation
is a desirable one is a matter many of us hold strong opinions about, but
we cannot ground our sense of that on how language works. Language
works persuasively, some think beautifully, to produce what many of us
view as horrendous social results-as when people are persuaded by very
effective speakers to join hate groups. That I would not view any lan-
guage producing such a result as "beautiful" is a social and substantive
assessment that I can defend on normative grounds. I cannot, however,
justify my assessment based upon linguistic form alone.
III. CONCLUSION
We have seen a number of points of continuity between White's view
and that of anthropological linguists-appreciation for the nontranspar-
ent creativity of language, an understanding of it as simultaneously social
and individual, an insistence on the importance of language-in-use, in
performance, in context. In contrast to older approaches, this is a vision
of language as valuable not because it affords insights into universal
structures or because it conveys preexisting information or concepts, but
rather because it is particularly sensitive to different social settings, par-
ticularly imbued with the social life of which it is a part.
Anthropology can add to this general picture both a fine-grained con-
cern for the details of grammatical structure of language and a rich feel-
ing for the socially creative and powerful character of linguistic
interaction. Lawyers can add to anthropologists' vision a normative
dimension, raising difficult questions about how to ground morality.
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From feminist and critical race theory scholars comes a suspicion of pro-
positional regimentation closely analogous to that of White, so that like
White in his final chapter, their writing takes on new and challenging
forms. Furthermore, the legal feminist and critical race theory
approaches share with anthropology an appreciation of the need for
socially-grounded accounts of language use. These accounts would at no
point assume the transparency of language to social results (e.g., a certain
kind of discourse form carrying within it given social results). Rather,
the social results of language use are viewed as contingent. Analysis of
how a particular discourse works in a given sociohistorical context is a
crucial step in understanding the role of language in constituting that
context.
There is also an insistence in these new approaches on true integration
of scholars of color and women scholars into other authors' texts-a real-
ization that these different and challenging voices will be truly integrated
only when they are taken seriously, responded to, and admitted to the
conversation. This is a challenge, based upon a deeply felt recognition of
the social power and foundation of our texts and language, that needs to
be heard not only in law, but also, shamefully, in anthropology. This
kind of inclusion would seem to fit very well with White's project,
because he writes so convincingly about the need for integration of many
kinds, including intellectual and social, and because it would move us
further toward the integrated community he envisions as the goal of legal
and other translations:
The proper object of human community is the recognition of the
equal value of each person as a center of worth and meaning. ...
Our deepest obligation and highest hope is to create a world in
which each person is fully recognized, in which each may achieve
the realization of his or her capacities for life.72
I have tried to bring together several alternate visions with the one
described by White, in the hope that they can enrich one another, per-
haps urging one another further along paths they have charted.
Although I have voiced a number of differences in perspective and
approach, I want to conclude by applauding the spirit of interdisciplinary
discussion that is created in White's text, his evident respect and open-
ness to other minds and other texts, and his passionate plea for an inte-
gration in language that builds community as well as individual selves.
72. J.B. WHITE, supra note 1, at 269.
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